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 introduction
This report is the final result of a six-year study of America’s school finance system, including 
more than 30 separate studies at a cost of $6 million and involving an interdisciplinary 
team of more than 40 scholars including many of the country’s best known economists, 
policy analysts, lawyers, and specialists in school finance, instruction, and educational in-
novation. All this work leads to one conclusion, that school finance today works against the 
focused and efficient use of resources to promote student learning.
Like an old computer that has become so laden with new applications that it can no longer 
do anything well, our school finance system is a product of many unrelated policies and 
administrative arrangements that, in combination, freeze everything up. We need a new 
model that is optimized to do one thing, that is, ensure that every child learns what she 
needs to become an involved citizen and full participant in a modern economy.
Today’s school finance systems fund programs, employ staff, sustain institutions, and 
provide resources so that district and school administrators can faithfully execute the 
thousands of laws and regulations that have grown up around public education. But the 
way today’s school finance systems do these things—establishing funding levels based on 
convention rather than need, masking actual allocations of funds, sustaining institutions 
whether they work or not, addressing equity in one place while ignoring it elsewhere, 
spending resources with little regard for results, holding adults accountable for compliance 
not results—tangles the connections between resources and academic goals that make 
money matter for student performance. 
Our school finance system developed in a much different era in which programs were 
funded, students succeeded or failed, and nobody paid too much attention. This was sus-
tainable then because there were jobs for people with low skills, and a healthy economy did 
not require that the vast majority of workers be well educated. But that legacy is unwork-
able in an era in which low-skilled workers are doomed to poverty and workers overseas 
can compete effectively for skilled jobs that were once available only to Americans.
What we have now is a finance system that is focused on maintaining programs and paying 
adults, not on searching for the most effective way to educate our children. This system 
doesn’t fit America’s needs. We have not figured out how to educate the growing number 
of poor and minority children effectively, but we finance and control schools as if we knew 
exactly how. Schools must adapt to the needs of a fast-changing economy, but our financing 
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system ties up funds for the same courses and modes of teaching developed generations 
ago. Schools need to experiment with technologies that might change teacher and student 
work, but the financing system forces them to spend all their money on a fixed set of orga-
nizations, programs, and people.
Those realities clearly impede the nation’s ability to use resources strategically, effectively, 
and accountably. Our children deserve and need a good education and we must do ev-
erything possible to provide it. However, no matter how concerned Americans are about 
education, the reality is that spending will always be finite, and schools will never be able to 
afford absolutely everything that some educator might find a way to use effectively. Rising 
costs and competition with other sectors (for example, health care, public safety) inevitably 
put education in a squeeze. Even if we could double or triple spending on public education, 
it would still be important to make sure every dollar counted. Otherwise, it would always 
be true that Americans—parents, taxpayers, and educators—would be doing less for our 
children than the money available allows. Thus, no matter how much money is available to 
pay for schools, there will always be a need to use it as effectively as possible.
Recognizing the complexity and subtle nature of both the problem and the systems respon-
sible for funding schools, the Center on Reinventing Public Education proposed a multi-year 
applied research and development strategy to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation in the 
summer of 2003. The School Finance Redesign Project (SFRP) would have four goals:
Provide an empirical basis and policy options for redesigning the nation’s K-12 1. 
school finance systems to support student performance.
Integrate research with state policy initiatives.2. 
Educate the audiences that influence school finance policy and practice.3. 
Craft implementation tools for practitioners.4. 
This final report integrates the project’s findings on the first three of these objectives. The 
fourth (implementation tools) is partially covered in a series of working papers com-
missioned by the project between 2003 and 2007 and is proposed as the major focus of 
follow-on work in 2008-09.1
A companion report has also been issued by the National Working Group on Funding 
Student Learning, a group of distinguished scholars and practitioners asked to provide 
1. See papers in appendix B by Richard Brandon; Stephen Frank and Karen hawley Miles; and diana Sharp and 
John Bransford.
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expert views on the issues SFRP has addressed.2 Jacob Adams, Founding Director of SFRP, 
convened and led this group and drafted its report.3
The two reports are different in that the Working Group Report represents a consensus 
vision hammered out among experts with different points of view, while this report provides 
a broader context and more direct links to SFRP’s research. This report also provides much 
more explicit treatment of key ideas like continuous improvement and performance-based 
accountability. However, the bottom lines of both reports are the same. As the Working 
Group Report argues: 
. . . For a quarter century, America’s schools have been searching for student 
learning and falling short. The sum of new finance-oriented legal theories, 
legislative actions, analytic perspectives, and management decisions has 
not closed the gap between the nation’s educational ambitions and student 
accomplishments. In fact, spending increases have outstripped achievement 
gains, and new funding programs have not propelled students over the 
performance bars set by states. It seems that the connection between resources 
and learning has been growing weaker, not stronger.
A basic flaw in these improvement efforts is that they look to the education 
finance system for solutions when the system itself is the problem . . . . State 
education finance systems were not designed with student learning in mind, 
nor have the superintendents and principals who manage educational 
resources been trained to make the strategic connection between resources 
and learning one would expect in a learning-oriented system. What’s more, 
because of the way these systems operate, elected officials, educational leaders, 
and the public are equally hard pressed to know how resources actually have 
been deployed or the ways they may (or may not) contribute to learning.
The bottom line is that education finance needs to be redesigned to support 
student performance. To get there, a more fundamental analysis and approach 
to resource management is needed, one that steps back from incremental 
funding increases, new programs, and conventional practices to tackle the 
more basic question: How can resources support the nation’s ambitions for 
student learning? 
2. Members are acknowledged in appendix a.
3. See the National Working Group on Funding Student learning (2008).
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All of SFRP’s work comes together in four recommendations for a new school finance 
system optimized to promote student learning:
Drive all funds to schools based on student counts. 1. 
Keep linked data about uses of funds and results.2. 
Encourage innovation and experimentation.3. 
Hold schools and districts accountable for student performance  4. 
and continuous improvement.
Together these recommendations would both permit and demand relentless innovation 
and school improvement, building on what works and eliminating what does not. They 
would also transform states and local school districts into managers of diverse portfolios 
of schools, constantly changing in light of evidence about performance.
When an old computer becomes overloaded and incapable of doing what’s asked of it, the 
best solution is to switch to a new model built to handle the work that must be done. The 
transition can cost some money and require users to learn new methods. But the alterna-
tive, continuing to increase the complexity of tasks that must be done by a system that was 
built to work in simpler times, is worse.
Like an outdated computer, our school finance system was not built to support today’s 
work: making sure all students learn what they need to be competent, productive adults. 
Further tinkering with the same old system is not likely to make it work better, but could 
overload it further and thus make things worse. We suggest how states, localities, and even 
the federal government can switch to a more productive new system.    
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chaPter 1.  
the Broad shape of Public school Finance
Because school finance is where politics, funding, and educational programming come 
together, it is both complex and challenging. By “school finance” we mean that field of 
public finance that is concerned with paying for K-12 public education. 
Schools are operated by districts and funded by a combination of locally raised property/levy 
monies, state tax revenues, and federal dollars targeted to certain students and programs. 
Funds, in effect, trickle down to the school level, passing through the agency hierarchy 
along the way. By the time the funds reach the school they have been assigned to and are 
accounted for by those in charge of policy and management, they arrive in “resource units.” 
District officials divide up the units. School-level personnel have only to apply them to 
their assigned purposes: instruction, curriculum, school materials, and the like. That is to 
say that a school is provided with “resources” instead of cash.  A school might be entitled 
to receive, for example, a teacher for every 30 students; a guidance counselor for every 600 
students; a teacher’s aide for every 200 students; and an assistant principal if enrollment 
exceeds 600. 
Two points are important about this “resourcing” approach:  First, the formulas lead to 
“lumpy” funding. Two nearly identical schools located close to each other can be staffed 
quite differently, depending on tiny differences in enrollment. A school with 602 students 
may have a central staff consisting of a principal, an assistant principal, and a guidance 
counselor, while the school in the adjoining neighborhood, with three fewer students, is 
asked to make do only with a principal, since enrollment below 600 does not trigger assign-
ment of an assistant or a counselor. The former school might also have one more teacher, if 
its district follows the common practice of allocating one teacher for every 20 pupils.
Second, schools have very little discretion over how the money allocated to them is spent. 
This prevents principals and teachers from making sensible trade-offs among items that 
cost the same—say a new classroom aide or access to a new internet-based teaching tool. A 
typical public school receives a certain number of teachers and administrators and cannot 
decide, for example, to employ fewer administrators and more teachers or to use the salaries 
needed to pay two senior teachers and instead employ three lower-paid ones. Nor can a 
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school that finds itself with a junior and lower-paid teaching force use the money saved on 
salaries to hire more teachers or offer extra pay to attract a few senior teachers.4 
how Much Money is available?
The first thing that strikes a newcomer to the discussion is that there is a massive amount 
of money in the K-12 system. In 2004-05, total expenditures on K-12 public education 
amounted to more than $499 billion for current expenditures, administration, capital 
outlays, meals, transportation, and debt service (Snyder, Dillow, and Hoffman 2008). These 
funds, just shy of half a trillion dollars, come mostly from state and local sources, but 
also include federal support and private contributions. They support a large and complex 
system made up of some 14,000 school districts, 97,000 schools, 54 million students, and 
3.1 million teachers, plus administrative and support staff.  
Put another way, nearly 20% of the American population is involved in K-12 education as 
a student, a teacher, or an administrator, and financing the enterprise accounts for about 
4% of GDP.  
Nationally, states provide 47% of the funding; local educational agencies (acting on the state’s 
behalf) provide 44%; and the federal government provides about 9% (Snyder, Dillow, and 
Hoffman 2008). Excluding Hawaii (which is a single-district state), the highest proportion 
of state support is found in places like Vermont (85%), Minnesota and New Mexico (both 
at 60%); the lowest proportion, in states such as Nevada (27%), Illinois and Nebraska at 
about 31%, and Missouri and South Dakota (34%) (Snyder, Dillow, and Hoffman 2008). 
Spending Per Pupil
Total spending per pupil differs quite dramatically from state to state (see figure 1). At the 
high end of expenditure levels we find New Jersey and New York, where combined federal, 
state, and local current expenditures totaled more than $13,000 per pupil, on average, in 
2004-05. Washington, D.C., also spends more than $13,000 per pupil. At the low end, we 
find Utah, Idaho, and Arizona, each spending less than $6,500 per pupil. The U.S. average 
in 2004-05 was $8,701 per pupil.  
4. See, for example, Roza and hawley-Miles (2006).
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Figure 1. State-by-State total current expenditureS per pupil, 2004-2005
 Source: Snyder, Dillow, and Hoffman (2008).
These differences reflect many things—state-by-state variations in prevailing wages, cost 
of living, traditional size of government, and tax bases, as well as commitment to public 
education. 
Fifty years ago, local property taxes accounted for perhaps 70-80% of school funding, with 
the remainder provided by states and very little provided by the federal government. Today, 
in an effort to equalize intrastate funding disparities, states typically cover nearly 50% of 
school funding.
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Because state and local spending patterns differ and federal allocations are frequently tied 
to state per-pupil expenditures (justified as a gross cost-of-education adjustment), the 
proportion of funding provided by federal, state, and local authorities differs quite dra-
matically from state to state. Figure 2 displays the results in four states examined during 
the School Finance Redesign Project.
Figure 2.  expenditure patternS in Four StateS
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Local*StateFederal
Washington
Texas
Ohio
North Carolina 10% 64% 27%
6% 45% 49%
10% 41% 49%
9% 62% 29%
Funding Percentage by Government Level
*Intermediate Revenue included in Local Revenue Total
Source: U.S. Department of Education (2002-2003).
In each of the four states above, the difference in the proportionate federal contribution is 
not great (between 6% and 10%). However, state contributions differ substantially, from 
41% in Texas to 64% in North Carolina. Local contributions also vary widely, from 49% in 
both Ohio and Texas to 27% in North Carolina and 29% in the State of Washington. 
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Local funds are likely to depend on local wealth or the community tax base. The normal 
pattern one would expect to see is that the greater the reliance on local funds, the greater 
the disparity in per-pupil spending at the district level.
It comes as no surprise, then, that in the aggregate, districts in different states spend 
different amounts per pupil, as revealed in figure 3 below. In the four states analyzed by 
SFRP, average local funding ranged from less than $2,000 per pupil (North Carolina) to 
nearly $5,000 (Ohio), while state funding ranged from about $3,300 in Texas to nearly 
$5,300 in Washington. The range of federal contributions was constrained within much 
tighter boundaries.
Figure 3.  per-pupil expenditureS, by Source oF FundS, in Four StateS
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how localities Spend Money
How equitably do local districts disburse the money they receive? Evidence to answer 
this question comes from three sources: California data comparing educational expendi-
tures in schools with low-income students and more advantaged populations; Texas data 
that explore the same issues; and comparisons of the per-pupil costs of regular instruc-
tion versus instruction for Advanced Placement (typically provided to more advantaged 
students).
Table 1, derived from California data, shows that children in low-income schools get less of 
the money provided by state and local sources to staff and operate schools than do children 
in higher-income schools. Schools with more advantaged populations have more teachers 
per 1,000 students, and these teachers are paid higher salaries. In addition, the wealthier 
schools receive larger amounts of money, per student, from funds controlled by the local 
school district’s central bureaucracy. These differences add up, so that across California, 
schools in more advantaged neighborhoods receive nearly $800 more per pupil than 
schools with the highest proportions of poverty students. 
table 1.  unreStricted Spending per pupil in elementary 
SchoolS (across Sampled cal ifornia distr icts)
category low poverty high poverty
Teachers per 1,000 students 44.9 41.5
Average teacher salary $57,242 $47,545
Funds from other district sources $1,839 $1,648
Total general fund spending per pupil $4,409 $3,621
Source: Rose, Sonstelie, and Reinhard (2006).
What is true in California happens to some degree in every other state and every large 
district. Higher-income schools attract the highest paid teachers, both statewide and 
within particular districts. The majority of districts allow senior teachers to choose their 
places of work, leading to significantly different salary expenditures between similarly 
sized schools. These differences are obscured in district budgets, which ignore differences 
in teacher salaries when reporting the amounts spent at different schools. 
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While low-income schools often have extra staff members paid by federal and state spe-
cial-purpose categorical programs, higher-income schools often have more teachers and 
administrators paid from state and local funds provided to support basic school opera-
tions. Higher-income schools’ greater access to basic state and local resources can more 
than offset any advantage low-income schools get as a result of federal programs. 
Both states and the federal government also fund targeted programs, intended not to pay 
the basic costs of schooling but to support extra services and teachers for specific groups of 
students. These are called categorical programs. The best-known categorical program is the 
federal Title I, which provides extra funding for low-achieving students in high-poverty 
schools. But states also fund such programs for various target groups. Unfortunately, federal 
and state governments often work against one another, with state categorical programs 
targeting schools and students not likely to benefit from Title I.
Figure 4 shows what often happens, based in this case on Texas data. The highest-poverty 
Texas schools get virtually all the federal money. But they get a much smaller share of state 
special purpose funds than do lower-poverty schools. Thus, special state programs can 
more than offset the advantages high-poverty schools get from federal programs (Roza, 
Guin, and Davis 2008; Roza 2007).
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Figure 4.  Federal and State categorical Spending on poverty, 
in one texaS diStrict
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Finally, in a perverse outcome, our analyses indicate that schools often spend much less 
money per pupil on core courses like English and mathematics than on elective courses. 
Figure 5 shows results from one district in which students in elective courses get the benefit 
of more spending than students in core courses that determine high school graduation 
(and on which state accountability plans focus). These are new results based on Marguerite 
Roza’s analyses of six urban and suburban districts. Results vary somewhat among the 
districts, but some of the worst patterns were the most persistent. Different class sizes (large 
classes for core courses, small classes for special electives), teacher salaries (senior teachers 
can claim the elective courses for themselves), and different workloads (senior teachers 
often teach fewer courses) work together to skew spending. 
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District and school accounting often hide these spending patterns. Most district leaders 
express surprise when shown numbers like these and say they would not have chosen to 
allocate their dollars in these ways. But district leaders and principals are often unaware of 
how much they are spending or what other uses might be made of the same funds. 
Figure 5.  per-pupil coStS by courSe type
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Principals and teachers would often make different choices about use of the same money 
if they could. We studied schools in which principals have different degrees of control over 
spending (Roza, Davis, and Guin 2007). As figure 6 shows, principals with the greatest 
control over funds, such as those in private, charter, and district-decentralized schools, hire 
larger numbers of teachers but pay lower salaries on average than principals in district-run 
schools, who have no choices about whom to hire. Our study also showed that principals 
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who have greater control of funds also focus their spending on generalist classroom teachers 
and part-time teachers and, relative to district-run schools, employ fewer administrators, 
classroom aides, and full-time specialist teachers. 
Studies from the United Kingdom also show that funds are used differently when school 
heads—who feel responsible to tailor instruction to their current students’ needs—gain 
control of spending decisions (Levacic 1999). 
Another SFRP-sponsored study shows that teachers, if they had choices about how to use 
funds, would often choose salary increases over equal-cost alternatives like extra time for a 
classroom aide or a slight reduction in class size (Goldhaber and DeArmond 2008). 
Figure 6.  expenditure patternS in diFFerent KindS oF SchoolS
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Source: Roza, Davis, and Guin (2007). 
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Overall, we have a system in which so much is controlled by decisions made in the past, 
sometimes for reasons and on behalf of people who are no longer in the system, and at such 
a distance from schools, that educators have scant flexibility to adapt to the needs of here 
and now. Teachers and principals, the people whose work the whole system is supposed 
to support, get complexity and constraint rather than help. In the meantime, the costs of 
everything are hidden, and people who would like to make trade-offs in pursuit of more 
effective schools cannot do so.
Our school finance system has: 
a lot of money in it; ■
considerable diversity in how much is spent, per state and per district; ■
great complexity in terms of the financial interactions between states and localities  ■
and the federal government;
patterns of inequitable distribution of state and local funds;  ■
federal programs that only partly compensate for inequities in state and local fund  ■
distribution;
course funding practices that provide higher-paid teachers and smaller classes for  ■
students in elective classes; and
complex expenditure patterns at the local level that cannot readily be tied to  ■
student outcomes.
Finance System is a Product of Competing agendas, intergovernmental 
Competition 
In light of the patterns reported above, it is essential to understand that state and federal 
legal and regulatory frameworks, some built for education and others created for other 
purposes entirely, govern the transfer and expenditure of funds from the federal to the 
state to the local levels. They include complex administrative, budgeting, and auditing re-
quirements and procedural and accounting specifications that affect school districts as well 
as state and county governments. 
In combination, these elements form a powerful triangle within which legislators (creators 
of the public laws), the executive branch (including budget and auditing offices), and 
agency officials (the source of regulations implementing legislation) tie the hands of states, 
school districts, and schools. Typically they call for:
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uniform application and enforcement of regulations; ■
plans for the expenditure of funds in accordance with the law, under control of  ■
public agencies, and in ways that can be monitored and audited;
disbursement of, and accounting for, funds in ways that can be attributed to par- ■
ticular programs but cannot easily be traced to any particular school, classroom, 
or student;
detailed record-keeping requirements, often tied to the purposes for which the  ■
funds were disbursed; and
internal auditing standards that ensure control of funds, assessment of risk, and  ■
ongoing monitoring.
These requirements, with their emphasis on compliance and control, make sense as ways 
to structure intergovernmental relations. Local educators are not inventing excuses when 
they explain their actions in terms of compliance; higher levels of government (for example, 
Congress) require assurances that funds are spent for the purposes designated. 
This accumulation of requirements establishes a federal-state regulatory maze that 
local budget managers and educators are required to navigate. It holds recipients and 
subrecipients accountable for particular uses of public funds and for following directives 
regarding recordkeeping, audits, and accounting of funds.  
However, none of these requirements guarantees that funds will be used efficiently, 
equitably, or in ways that contribute the most to local school effectiveness. State, local, 
and district officials often claim that the requirements prevent the most productive uses 
of funds.
One issue that a reformed school finance system would need to address is this regulatory 
structure and the changes that would be required in it. It is, for example, unlikely that most 
school principals would have the time, training, or inclination to master this regulatory 
maze well enough to find ways to be both innovative and compliant. 
Even funds raised at the local level are strictly regulated. Most of the dollars subject to local 
control are allocated via teacher hiring, salary increases, and work assignment decisions, 
which are structured by collective bargaining agreements. School boards often enter 
such agreements with poor understanding of how funds are currently used and what the 
different parts of a teacher labor contract will cost (Roza and Carey 2007). In many recent 
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cases, local school boards have approved contracts with salary escalator clauses that would 
create significant budget deficits only two or three years hence (Lilly 2005). Boards also 
frequently commit to pay teacher healthcare and pension contributions that cost little in 
the year they are made but have major “balloon payments” later (Loeb and Miller 2007; 
Podgursky and Ehlert 2007). As a result, many districts have no flexibility whatever in the 
ways they use locally raised funds. 
Districts also have a great deal of difficulty knowing where their money is or what things 
cost. This is so in part because districts keep separate accounts for things that are neces-
sarily mingled together to run a school or deliver any instructional service. Thus, costs of 
salaries, benefits, facilities, technology, and private contracts for services are often kept in 
separate data systems, making it difficult to know the combined costs of any given resource 
or activity. The practice of keeping accounts district-wide means that it is almost impos-
sible for district leaders to know exactly how much is spent on a particular school from the 
salary, benefits, or technology accounts and therefore what is spent overall on any school. 
The metaphor used in the introduction—that of a computer overloaded with applications 
for which it was not built and which compete for core time and interfere with one another’s 
operation—is apt here.
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chaPter 2.  
expenditures and results 
The preceding chapter pointed to a system spending half a trillion dollars, yet creating 
inequitable intrastate and intradistrict fund distribution and failing, despite announced 
intentions, to provide the greatest financial resources to students in the greatest need.
In the past, legal challenges to this system have focused on disparities in providing 
interdistrict fiscal equity (Warner-King and Smith-Casem 2005). More recently, intradistrict 
or subdistrict studies have questioned the importance of district-level spending differences, 
showing that there is more variation in per-pupil spending within than between districts 
(Roza, Guin, Gross, and DeBurgomaster 2007). The subdistrict studies, in particular, point 
to district budgeting and allocation practices that create significant variation in spending 
across schools (Roza 2006; Roza 2008a; Carey and Roza 2008). 
What does this society gain in return for the funds it expends? 
On levels of expenditure, a fair analysis might compare per-pupil spending in 1980 (about 
the time a modern system of K-12 schooling, fully accessible to both minority students 
and those with disabilities, came fully into being) with today’s.5 During this period, total 
per-pupil spending grew from $6,462 in 1980 to $11,470 in 2004 (in constant 2006-07 
dollars—see figure 7). Here funding grew impressively from 1980 to 1989 and remained 
flat throughout much of the 1990s before beginning another impressive rise as the 1990s 
drew to a close.
5. Public law 94-142 (the predecessor to today’s individuals with disabilities Education act) was enacted in 1975 
in response to significant court rulings in Washington, d.C., Pennsylvania, and elsewhere, holding that students 
with disabilities were entitled to a free and appropriate public education.
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Figure 7.  growth in total per-pupil expenditureS,  1980-2004, 
in conStant 2006-2007 dollarS 
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Though there are arguments about whether the chart in figure 7 takes full account of factors 
that drive up the costs of education—like salaries, benefits, and service entitlements—it is 
clear that public education employs more people and provides a more extensive range of 
services in the current era than ever before.6
In that light, what about student achievement? What are we getting for what we spend? Is it 
true that student achievement has stagnated? What are we receiving, in the broadest terms 
around student achievement, for the vast amounts of money spent on American schools?  
To analyze these questions, we examine the only nationally comparable student achieve-
ment results available, the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). NAEP 
long-term trend results are available for national samples of 9-, 13-, and 17-year-old 
6. See also hanushek and Rivkin (1997).
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students, in several subject areas. NAEP also provides state-level results at the 4th- and 
8th-grade levels. 
National Results
NAEP results suggest modest improvements in mathematics achievement over recent 
decades, combined with stagnation with respect to verbal skill and reading.
Figure 8.  naep national reSultS, 17-year-old StudentS
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Source: U.S. Department of Education (2005a,b).
With respect to NAEP results for 17-year-old students, average mathematics scores seem 
to have improved modestly from around 298 in 1982 to 307 in 2004 (see figure 8).7   For 
7. For a much richer discussion of these and other NaEP score trends, see loveless (2007).
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reading scores of 17-year-old students, no change is apparent from 1980 to 2004. Both 
results come at a time when the face of American public education has changed dra-
matically, with more members of minority groups enrolled in schools, including many 
non-native English speakers.
The NAEP analysis for 13-year-old students is similar (see figure 9).8 Here, reading results 
hover around the 260 mark, without a lot of variation, and mathematics results appear to 
improve, although only slightly, from an average of 269 to 281 since 1982. 
Figure 9.  naep national reSultS,  13-year-old StudentS
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8. This analysis did not examine 4th-grade NaEP results.
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State-level Results
What about the state level? What are states getting for their expenditures? Here we turned to 
NAEP 8th-grade results to compare state NAEP results with state per-pupil expenditures.9 
The result is a scattergram of 51 state (including Washington, D.C.) 8th-grade averages in 
reading, displayed in figure 10.
Figure 10.  relationShip oF current Spending per pupil and  
8th-grade naep reading
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 expenditure data from Snyder, Dillow, and Hoffman (2008).
At first blush, there seems to be little relationship between high spending and average 
8th-grade NAEP reading results. One jurisdiction spending in excess of $14,000 per 
pupil reports average scores of about 270 (close to the high end of results), while another 
spending more than $13,000 per pupil reports the lowest 8th-grade reading score in the 
nation. Meanwhile, states spending much less (between $5,500 and $8,000 per pupil) find 
themselves with average scores above the national average.  
9. Results for Grade 8 were employed because NaEP provides state-level results for 50 states and the district of 
Columbia (plus american possessions) at the 4th- and 8th-grade levels, but not consistently for Grade 12.
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However, a trend line drawn through the scattergram reveals a modest but real relation-
ship between spending and results. It is impossible to say this is causal. It is conceivable 
that additional expenditures produce better results; it is equally conceivable that states with 
the wherewithal to spend more on education begin with a student population with fewer 
educational challenges.
Figures 11 and 12, below, reveal what seem to be more powerful connections. Figure 
11 indicates that as the proportion of low-income students in a state declines, average 
8th-grade NAEP reading results increase. The converse is also true: high proportions of 
low-income students are associated with low NAEP reading results. This trend line is even 
more marked if a comparison is made between minority enrollment and achievement (see 
figure 12).
Figure 11.  proportion oF low-income StudentS and naep  
8th-grade reading reSultS
Source: U.S. Department of Education (2008). 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
St
at
e 
St
ud
en
ts
 E
lig
ib
le
 fo
r F
re
e 
an
d 
 R
ed
uc
ed
-P
ric
e 
Lu
nc
h 
State Average 2007 8th Grade NAEP Reading Scores 
70%
80%
90%
100%
235 240 245 250 255 260 265 270 275
24 Facing the Future
Figure 12.  proportion oF minority StudentS and naep  
8th-grade reading reSultS
Source: Minority data from Synder, Dillow, and Hoffman (2008); 
 NAEP data from U.S. Department of Education (2008).
Of the 20 states with NAEP results below the national average, fully 16 also spend less than 
the annual national per-pupil average. Just 4 low-scoring states spend more. In addition, 
of those 20 low-achieving states, 17 have a higher proportion of low-income children than 
the national average (38%); in fact, 52% of their enrollment, on average, consists of low-
income students. 
Meanwhile, of the 31 states with NAEP results above the national average, 24 have a lower 
proportion of low-income children than the national average; only 7 have at least as high a 
proportion as the national average. With respect to spending, 18 of these states spend less 
than the national average per pupil, and 13 spend more.
What seems clear is the following:
Expenditures have increased in the last generation. ■
Some modest improvements are apparent in mathematics results nationally. ■
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The same cannot be said for results in the areas of verbal skill and reading. Here,  ■
achievement seems to have languished.
At the state level, there seems to be a relationship between spending and results,  ■
but it cannot be said to be causal.
Generally, the higher the proportion of minority and low-income students in a  ■
state, the lower the average NAEP results are likely to be.
These facts provide background to the continuing round of lawsuits and state legislative 
struggles over school finance, in which one side emphasizes the hope that higher spending 
might produce more equitable results of schooling, and the other counters that spending 
increases don’t lead to higher student performance.
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chaPter 3.  
the school Finance Debate
In response to clear inequities in interdistrict funding (within states) and claims of in-
adequate funding, parents, advocates, and local districts have long pursued additional 
funds and more equitable distribution of funds. Leaving special needs populations, such 
as students with disabilities and English-language learners, aside, court cases have been 
pursued in two directions, largely sequentially. The first wave of court cases, starting in the 
1970s and running into the early 1990s, was brought on equity grounds. Plaintiffs argued 
that states were not meeting their constitutional obligations to provide equal educational 
opportunity while they supported school finance systems that permitted local expendi-
tures to differ by a factor of 3 to 1 or more. A string of “equalization” suits at the state level 
stretches back to the 1970s Texas Rodriguez case (and accounts for much of the movement 
toward increased state aid noted in chapter 1 of this report).10
Even when equity cases succeeded in court, their ultimate results were often less than 
advocates had hoped. As Molly McUsic comments: “[W]hile the equity cases enjoy a 
number of victories in the courtroom, it has been harder to carry that victory through the 
legislature to the classroom. Even cases that succeeded in court (less than half of all cases 
filed) often fail to equalize funding or educational opportunity. Moreover, despite litigation 
in nearly every state over the past two decades, interdistrict disparities in the United States 
have not diminished” (McUsic 1998). These results led to a second wave of litigation, based 
on a new principle. 
Many analysts date the beginning of the second wave of lawsuits, dubbed “adequacy” ap-
proaches, to the 1989 Rose case in Kentucky, which ended with the state Supreme Court 
finding the entire structure of public schooling in Kentucky unconstitutional, along with its 
financing.11 The adequacy position argues that it is possible both to say what must be done 
to provide an effective education for all children and to determine what such an education 
would cost. Therefore, proponents claim, states are under an obligation to provide at least 
as much money as an adequate education would cost. 
10. For a review of the recent litigation, see McUsic (1998).
11. Rose v. Council for Better Education, 790 S.W. 2d 186 (Kentucky Supreme Court 1989). 
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More recently, economists have put forward an “efficiency” framework. They argue that 
while it may be possible to define an adequate outcome, it is impossible to state how to 
attain it, in part because few successful examples exist, and those that do cannot be reliably 
replicated. The efficiency argument also holds that it is clear the educational system does 
not use all existing money efficiently and that it is hard to justify a more expensive version 
of the same inefficient system. The efficiency argument has yet to be tested or supported in 
a court of law.
The politics of each of these approaches—equity, adequacy, and efficiency—are daunting. 
Equity sounds fine in theory, but turns out to be difficult in practice. Surveys reveal that 
Americans support the general proposition that all children should receive equal funding 
in schools, but that middle- and upper-income communities quickly shift gears when 
efforts to equalize funding threaten local resources. “Robin Hood” redistribution plans, 
which take funds away from affluent communities and transfer them to lower-spending 
localities, produce serious political backlashes. Yet “leveling up” approaches, by which 
the state raises everyone else’s spending up to the level of the highest spending localities, 
cost more than most state treasuries can support. Adequacy is expensive and results are 
uncertain, both problems in a time of general disquiet about the effectiveness of public 
expenditures. The efficiency argument has to contend with opposition from stakeholders 
within the school system, along with the willingness of judges and many taxpayers to err 
on the side of spending more on education, rather than risk spending too little.  
Equity
Equity lawsuits arrived in two ways (Briffault 2007). The first challenged disparities in 
per-pupil spending based on the grounds of federal equal protection guarantees in the 
U.S. Constitution. As described by Richard Briffault, the litigation strategy based on the 
U.S Constitution came to an end in the case of San Antonio Independent School District 
v. Rodriguez (1973), when the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the federal equal protection 
theory as it applied to schools.  
A second wave of equity lawsuits was launched, grounded in state equal protection guar-
antees, and the second wave won a number of victories. In the landmark Serrano cases, for 
example, the California Supreme Court declared the state’s school finance system unconsti-
tutional because it made the quality of students’ education depend on the property wealth 
28 Facing the Future
of their communities.12 The court required the state to reduce wealth-related disparities in 
per-pupil expenditures. Yet, within a few short years, all of the analytical and constitutional 
distinctions underlying Serrano were set back as California voters enacted Proposition 13 
in 1978. This measure set a cap on property taxes, lowered them, demanded a two-thirds 
majority in both houses of the legislature for tax increases, and launched a taxpayer revolt 
across the nation. It did all of that, but the Serrano decision ensured that the effect was not 
invidiously applied to low-income districts and schools.  
As early as 1979, analysts at the RAND Corporation were pointing out that although it was 
apparent that spending for education was rising impressively in states where plaintiffs had 
won on equity grounds, reform did little to equalize the distributions of revenues or instruc-
tional expenditures (Carroll, Cox, and Lisowski 1979). Local property taxes for education 
declined in most states (and became significantly more equal among school districts), but 
reform generally did not equalize spending between rich and poor districts. The RAND 
analysts concluded that reform did little to equalize districts’ spending outcomes and 
opportunities, largely because of legislative add-ons and adjustments that allowed tradi-
tionally high-spending districts to find ways to spend extra.
adequacy
The wave of adequacy lawsuits that developed after the 1989 Rose case, including Abbott 
in New Jersey,13 increased substantially after No Child Left Behind was enacted in 2001. 
Indeed, following enactment but prior to its implementation, it was clear that the legisla-
tion had made some strange bedfellows: conservatives eager to impose strict performance 
accountability and liberal activists eager to use its provisions to force more money into 
public schools (Gorman 2001). 
To support the adequacy principle, scholars then worked up estimates of adequate spending. 
This was very difficult because no one had ever achieved the outcomes whose cost was to 
be estimated. Results were chaotic, often varying by billions of dollars for particular states. 
The Campaign for Fiscal Equity, which sought to increase per-pupil expenditures in New 
York City by nearly 50% to $18,000, won a lawsuit, but the legislature has not appropriated 
the funds. Calculations of the cost of providing an adequate education for all California 
12. See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal.3d 584 (1971); Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal.3d 728 (1976); Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal.3d 25 (1977).
13. abbott cases include a series of lawsuits beginning with Abbott v. Burke 100 N.J. 269, 495 a.2d 376 (1985).
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students range from $1.7 billion to $1.5 trillion, depending on the assumptions made by 
analysts (Imazeki 2008). But courts in many states accepted the adequacy principle and 
ordered huge spending increases. 
Big-money court orders in adequacy cases raised state spending by as much as 20% or 
even higher in some cases, but had about the same effects as the earlier equity-based settle-
ments. Traditionally high-spending districts continued to spend more, and within-district 
spending discrepancies and achievement gaps remained. 
In research done for SFRP, Alan Odden tried to rescue the adequacy principle by arguing 
that court orders should mandate uses of the extra money found by empirical research 
to be highly productive. However, the possible mandates identified by Odden’s research, 
for example, lowering class size and spending more on teacher training, slightly closed 
but did not eliminate racial and income-based gaps in student achievement. The question 
remained: How much is enough to spend, and how should resources be used. 
In the early 2000s, analysts from outside the school finance community realized that 
reaching the goal of high standards for all required rethinking of how all resources were 
used—both every dollar and everything dollars buy, from teacher work to student time.  
In a paper developed for this study, the authors estimate that in Tennessee a more extensive 
set of evidence-based strategies (including universal preschool education) would appear 
to increase required statewide expenditures by about 8% (Brandon, Stutman, and Blazys 
2007). Like the measures Odden recommended, these might improve average student 
performance, but they were not guaranteed to achieve the “adequacy” goal of raising all 
students to state standards.
Proposals linking particular instructional methods with levels of spending are where 
equity, adequacy, and efficiency intersect and come together. These proposals would 
require putting every dollar now in the system on the table for reallocation and application 
toward more promising, evidence-based practice. They would require profound changes 
in the funding practices, missions, and capacities of states and school districts, as the next 
chapter will show. 
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Efficiency
To date, the efficiency argument has been used in court as a defense against adequacy 
claims. The efficiency argument has three parts: The first is that there is a massive amount 
of money within the system already and that dramatic increases in funding over the years 
have not produced notable increases in student achievement. This issue was explored in 
the previous chapter.
The second argument is that we do not know what works (Guthrie and Hill 2007). This 
argument holds that research has not identified any program or level of expenditure that 
is consistently related to educational outcomes. Schools spending similar amounts and 
delivering similar programs get different results, and schools spending different amounts 
and delivering different programs often get similar results. Increasing expenditures using 
existing educational methods is not likely to improve outcomes substantially. It might be 
possible to understand what works best in particular situations, but our system does not 
allow the research and experimentation that could yield the necessary evidence. 
The third argument holds that opportunities exist for redirections and reductions in 
expenditures without deterioration in outcomes. Here the issue is directly defined as 
“efficiency”: 
It seems quite clear, and the evidence supports the case, that not all school 
systems use their funds as effectively as others. This fact raises a serious 
problem if one studies spending to get at the cost of an adequate education. 
Should the starting point simply be the current spending, accepting whatever 
is being done, or should there be some attempt to deal with the inefficiency 
issues? . . . The importance of this is immediately obvious. If spending must be 
sufficient to bring up achievement regardless of how efficiently resources are 
used, the answer is likely to be a very large number (Hanushek 2007).
The general proposition that the system is inefficient is also supported by evidence that 
categorical programs, particularly those from the federal government, magnify the inef-
ficiencies by adding new regulations, constraining options at the local level, and building 
small empires impervious to local control. In part there is also a suspicion that federal 
programs such as Title I, the main funding mechanism of No Child Left Behind, allocate 
funds in ways that do not reverse spending disparities. The fear is that it does so in two 
ways.
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First, federal Title I funds are supposed to supplement and not supplant local funds, and 
the services to be provided to target children are intended to be “comparable” before federal 
funds are added. The comparability regulations, however, explicitly exclude any consider-
ation of teacher salary schedules, which can create significant spending disparities between 
high- and low-income schools in the same district. 
Second, federal funds are typically allocated on formulas that rely on state per-pupil ex-
penditures (as a gross measure of cost differential) and guarantee all states some minimum 
level of funding (to encourage widespread political support in the U.S. Senate).  States with 
high incidences of student poverty tend to spend less per student than those with lower 
poverty rates. As Goodwin Liu wrote in a paper sponsored by SFRP, “high-poverty states 
tend to have low per-pupil spending. Among 18 states . . . with above-average poverty, all 
but two . . . spent less per pupil than the national average. As a result, these states have 
low Title I aid per student, even though they have high poverty” (Liu 2007). The alloca-
tion results mean “places like Wyoming with fewer than 10,000 poor children received 
$2,957 per child [from the federal government], while Arizona with 213,000 poor children 
received $881 per child” (Cross and Roza 2007).
In a nutshell, we are left with three different principles for judging the ways schools are 
funded. Litigation based on the equity principle appears to have run out of steam, although 
it frequently becomes internalized as part of the adequacy standard. The adequacy standard 
claims to rest on evidence-based approaches, but the results vary so dramatically (suggest-
ing the need for spending increases as low as 2% and as high as 1,000%) that it is hard to 
know what to do with them. The efficiency standard rejects the idea that there is any com-
pelling evidence behind the adequacy approach and calls for more experimentation to test 
and compare alternative uses of funds.
The next section takes a deeper look at the problem of connecting school finance arrange-
ments with consequences for students.  
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chaPter 4.  
the Finance/achievement Mismatch
In the introduction to this report, we argued that a lack of connection between spending 
and student learning is built into our school finance system. This chapter shows why that is 
so and examines what is known about connecting finance with student achievement. 
Today’s Finance Systems Support Programs, Not Results
Consider the way finance systems operate today. They fund enrollment, adjust funding to 
property wealth, and use categorical grants to target particular needs. They pay staff on a 
salary schedule; account for spending by fund, function, and object; and accommodate 
intergovernmental contributions. They budget incrementally but add programs readily. 
Our education finance system is a set of programs, rules, and appropriations created at 
different times for different reasons. Every program, rule, or appropriation made sense in 
its own terms, whether or not it was complementary or compatible with other programs or 
rules created earlier. Over time the sheer mass of different programs, rules, and appropria-
tions exceeded educators’ ability to find ways of using them all effectively together. Though 
it is possible to honor the intentions behind all the diverse programs, that make up our 
school finance system and comply with all the rules, it is not possible simultaneously to 
maximize student learning. 
Finance Systems are haphazard, Not Strategic 
Over time, finance system adaptations have resulted in a haphazard collection of intergov-
ernmental agendas, funding formulas, and categorical programs; accounting requirements, 
collective bargaining agreements, and authority relationships; implicit incentives, account-
ability measures, and stakeholder demands. That is, education finance systems have been 
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responsive but not strategic. Along the way, the sum of their adaptations became “the way 
we do things” rather than “the things we need to do.”14 
Finance Systems are oriented around Compliance, Not outcomes 
The degree to which local initiative is stymied by what we earlier called a state and federal 
regulatory maze is remarkable. Throughout this study, local educators complained that 
their hands were so tied by regulations that they could not make even the most common-
sense adjustments to their programs. Teachers funded out of one line item sometimes 
cannot be employed, even temporarily, in another capacity. Strict auditing requirements 
force schools and districts into a compliance mentality. As one local administrator told us: 
“The K-12 system is like a tanker . . . . You’re not going to do anything fast with a tanker 
. . . . You’re dealing with so many people and so many ingrained methods, procedures, 
contracts. (Everything) gets in the way (De Wys et al. 2008).”
Comments such as this reveal genuine concern among local educational leaders about 
their lack of flexibility. In a survey of some 150 school superintendents, fully 82% reported 
that more flexibility in allocating dollars and resources was either “essential” to school 
improvement or would be “a great deal of help;” 77% said they could do their jobs better if 
there were less paperwork. State and federal regulations were cited as either a “strong” or 
“mild” barrier by two-thirds of respondents (Loeb 2007). 
Finance Systems Focus on adult Needs, Not Those of Students
In the final analysis this may be the most troubling conclusion of all: Instead of taking 
student needs as the starting point and designing systems to meet them, traditional finance 
systems and approaches take the existing order of things, including collective bargain-
ing agreements, and build on that. The result is a system that is at least as much oriented 
around meeting adult needs as it is around those of the students the system was established 
to serve.
14. For instance, the federal regulatory response to early local misappropriation of Title i funds led to a system-
wide compliance mentality; accounting by fund, function, and object; and the single salary schedule, all of which 
separate resources from student success, elevate process over results, and impede coherent instructional programs 
or effective spending. See Cross and Roza (2007).
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Here again, local administrators were eloquent in their complaints about how difficult it 
is to modify the existing order of things. While endorsing contract conditions that ensure 
fair treatment of teachers, educators also told us that contracts prevent them from taking 
steps they believe necessary to improve performance, such as lengthening class periods 
and school days and years, keeping students with the same teacher for multiple years, and 
trading larger class sizes in non-core subjects for smaller classes in core subjects. Removing 
ineffective teachers is a particular bone of contention. As one principal put it: “It takes so 
much time and effort from an administrator—sitting in their classrooms on a weekly basis, 
(providing) written feedback, meeting with the teachers, meeting with the union reps—to 
move a teacher out of the system. It takes a whole lot of time to do that (De Wys et al. 
2008).” 
That principal also spoke for many superintendents. Large majorities of responding 
superintendents want less restrictive teacher contracts (75%), more freedom to dismiss in-
effective teachers (84%), and more flexibility to reward those who are effective (69%) (Loeb 
2007). There is some evidence, illustrative and suggestive but not final or definitive, that 
provided with this freedom, behavior changes. Schools set up different staffing arrange-
ments for themselves, and teachers are willing to consider trade-offs between equal-cost 
alternatives—salary increments, teachers’ aides, or reduced class size (Roza, Davis, and 
Guin 2007; Goldhaber, Destler, and Player 2007). 
Finance Systems disconnect Resources From Results
There are only three reasons, but very big ones, why we don’t know how much it will cost 
to educate every child to standards. 
First, no one has yet met the goal of educating all children to high standards. Though some 
schools have done a great deal to close the achievement gap between privileged students 
and students disadvantaged by combinations of poverty, minority status, and unfamiliarity 
with English, none has been able to do so on a district- or city-wide scale. Thus, though we 
have success examples we don’t now how to get the same results everywhere. Nor do we 
have reason to think the same schools would work for everyone.
Second, we don’t allow money to be used to support fundamentally different ways of providing 
instruction. The ways we finance and regulate schools work against experiments with new 
modes of instructional delivery (for example, those trading some of the money now used 
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to pay teachers for technology-based resources), new sets of teacher skills, new ways of 
using student time (for example, via online lessons that students can access any time of 
day), new ways of mixing instruction with social and family services, or new individual-
ized assessment-driven instructional packages. Such experiments are impossible as long as 
uses of money, time, and people are all fixed in place by regulation. 
Third, we lack ways of measuring either the cost or the effectiveness of any instructional 
practice. For reasons explained above, it is extremely difficult to know what anything costs. 
The only way to know what a particular school, course, classroom, or program costs is to 
track all the salaries and other resources associated with it, and calculate their total actual 
costs (not averages or costs excluding hidden state or philanthropic contributions). To get 
per-pupil costs, it is necessary to use actual class sizes, hours of instruction, real expendi-
tures for salaries and benefits, and administrative and facilities costs. The current system 
makes these calculations extremely difficult. To date, only two scholars, Marguerite Roza 
and Karen Hawley Miles, have even attempted to make them. 
It is possible to understand the links among funding levels, uses of funds, and student 
results, but not if uses of funds are hidden or hopelessly complicated, or if educators are 
kept in the dark about costs and trade-offs. Though states and school districts try to measure 
effectiveness via test scores and student graduation, course completion, and dropout rates, 
we have no good way of linking these either to the amounts of money spent on a particular 
student’s education or to the programs and instructional resources (including teachers) to 
which she is exposed. Though extensive records are kept on students, teachers, programs, 
and schools, states generally resist combing them, in part because unions and school boards 
do not want productivity analysis done. The techniques and data necessary to distinguish 
more or less effective (and cost-effective) programs, courses, classrooms, and schools are 
all available, but our system has been built to make their use difficult.
Thus, our school finance system now prevents the experimentation that could uncover 
promising options and resists the analysis that would be required to show what is working 
and what is not. These deficiencies are built into our particular system, but they are not 
endemic to education. The final chapter will show how Americans can put themselves in a 
position to experiment, discover progressively better methods, transfer money and students 
to more effective schools and programs, and continue doing so until overall student perfor-
mance increases dramatically.  
36 Facing the Future
chaPter 5.  
toward a system that can  
Link resources and results
Table 2 outlines some of the major differences between the existing system and the one 
that must be put in place. The differences can be seen across the board—in philosophy and 
approach; how staff are selected, assigned, and compensated; and what is expected in terms 
of resource allocation and accountability. Where conventional approaches ask, “Is money 
distributed equitably among school districts?” a new performance-based system would 
raise the question, “Are resources reaching the students they are intended to serve?”
table 2.  elementS oF a new approach to School Finance
priorities and needs existing System new approach
Funding for what 
works
Funding for fixed institutions 
and staffing arrangements
Provide funding that can move 
freely from less effective to 
more effective uses
A focus on core needs Higher spending on electives Focus spending on core 
subjects, gatekeeper skills
No achievement gap Inexperienced and less expensive 
teachers in most challenged 
schools
Provide experienced teachers in 
challenged schools, or provide 
principals with equivalent in 
discretionary resources
Help for low-income 
students
Disproportionate spending on 
affluent students
Support disproportionate 
spending on low-income 
students
Strong school leaders 
and entrepreneurs
Self-selected managers Identify and groom problem 
solvers and instructional leaders
Capable teaching 
force
Rewards based on seniority; 
professional development 
expenditures compensate for low 
standards on hiring and tenure 
Provide rewards based on 
results
School environments 
conducive to learning
Unstable schools for the most 
disadvantaged, due to teacher 
turnover
Support stable and studious 
schools through teacher 
stability
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While the changes proposed in table 2 may disturb the existing order of things in local 
schools and districts, there is nothing earth shattering about any of the insights contained 
in it. In that context it is hard to justify a system that spends more per pupil on electives, 
the arts and athletics, and the needs of affluent students than it does on core courses, basic 
academic subjects, and meeting the needs of disadvantaged students. Where everyone 
would accept the importance of improving the school climate, while identifying and 
nurturing leadership and the best teachers, one must ask why, to date, we have stood by as 
teacher turnover destabilized schools, leaders selected themselves, and teaching rewards 
were based on seniority, not on performance or value to the school in which a teacher 
works. 
Another thing that needs to be said is that none of the changes above, or all of them combined, 
will guarantee that all students meet standards. What we can guarantee is that without 
changes of the sort outlined here and a continuous process of evaluating our progress and 
making needed adjustments, the system will never be able to help all students. 
How would we create such a system? Knowing that change is required and knowing what 
to do are two different things. It often helps to keep a simple idea in mind. The four-part 
schematic in figure 13 below divides the options about how to fund and regulate schools. 
Along the vertical dimension, financing options range from rigidity (funding mandates) 
to flexibility (funding students). Along the horizontal dimension, educational methods 
options range from standardization to innovation and experimentation.  
Figure 13.  optionS For Funding and regulating SchoolS
Fund Mandates
Fund Students  
Standardization Innovation and
Experimentation
Status Quo Planned
Variation
Continuous
Improvement
Equal Funding,
No Variation
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The upper left-hand quadrant is where we find ourselves today. Funding is rigid, controlled 
by formulas, and accompanied by mandates, and it encourages a type of standardization at 
the local level that is reinforced by rules, regulations, and audit requirements. 
The lower left-hand quadrant appears to be promising, but it really is not. It seems to 
encourage innovation by directing funding toward students, but stifles the urge almost 
immediately by marrying the funding innovation to standardized one-size-fits-all 
approaches. Big bets on universal reforms ignore the diversity of needs in American schools. 
Even if they benefit some schools (as happened, for example, when San Diego mandated 
standardized instruction in all schools), other schools do not improve. San Diego’s experi-
ence shows that localities starting with standardized approaches are ultimately forced into 
trying multiple approaches, that is, moving toward the lower right-hand quadrant.
The upper right-hand quadrant permits some experimentation in the form of planned 
variation. So, for example, trials of new methods like those developed by the New American 
Schools program funded by the private sector in the 1990s and the small schools effort 
supported by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation can be found in this quadrant. 
The right-hand side of the quadrant is where we need to go. Here financial flexibility 
promoted by a school finance system aimed at funding student needs meets a policy envi-
ronment encouraging innovation and experimentation. In this side, and particularly in the 
lower right-hand quadrant, we have precisely what we need to move forward: the ability to 
continuously improve local educational programming and learn as we go. 
Not knowing how to educate all children to high standards also means that we can’t know 
what it will cost to do so. A process of continuous improvement, in which everything is on 
the table and nothing is a sacred cow, is the way to move forward over the long term. In a 
society that is always open to the trial of new ideas, acceptance of innovation, and change 
or replacement of institutions that cannot keep up with new discoveries, K-12 education is 
the only one still stuck on the search for the one perfect solution. 
Toward Continuous improvement
As in every other field where current performance is unacceptable but higher performance 
is clearly possible, rules on the uses of funds must be opened up so that:
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Money and people can flow from approaches that are less productive to those that  ■
are more productive.
Potential innovators are encouraged to invest time and money developing new  ■
approaches.
Fair comparisons can be made between new and dominant approaches. ■
Performance improvement is the focus of accountability.  ■
These conditions combine to create a process of continuous improvement. No arrangement 
is ever assumed “good enough” just because it satisfies stakeholders or avoids violating any 
laws. To the contrary, even the best-performing school, teacher, or instructional program 
is assumed not to be the best possible. Every arrangement, even one that looks good at the 
present time, is subject to challenge and replacement by something better. 
The fact that the United States has created continuous improvement processes in other 
fields is why we benefit from a constant flow of innovations (e.g., in surgery) and how we 
know, for example, that some surgical practices (e.g., arthroscopic knee surgery) are better 
for patients than other approaches.  
The four conditions sketched above don’t promise success quickly. To the contrary, they 
will lead to failures as well as successes, just as our current system produces both. However, 
a continuous improvement system abandons failures rather than protecting or sustaining 
them, finds alternatives, and builds on successes. 
Based on work done for SFRP, we can identify the most important changes that states 
would have to make if they wanted to create a continuous improvement system.
Easy Movement of Money and People 
The key to creating a school finance system capable of continuous improvement is to avoid 
imposing arbitrary constraints on uses of money. If a significant amount of money is used 
for purposes whose effectiveness is not proven—for example, for administrative units that 
exist now only because they have existed for a long time—potentially more effective uses of 
the same money are rendered impossible. 
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This principle does not imply that every dime be spent in the classroom or that no money 
should be used for administration, performance oversight, teacher training, or outside as-
sistance to struggling schools. It does imply that no use of money should be considered 
privileged or untouchable and that any decision to use money in a particular way be subject 
to amendment in light of evidence.
Most states now distribute money for K-12 education in ways that make specific uses of 
funds permanent. Under a system of continuous improvement, distribution of funds would 
be considered contingent and subject to challenge. This is so even when states fund things 
that schools certainly need. Washington and North Carolina, for example, tie the lion’s 
share of state funding to teacher slots, one teacher for approximately every 20 students. 
What is to say that schools employing a different number of teachers than the state funds, 
or using some of the funds now dedicated to teachers to purchase online materials or in-
struction provided by museums or scientific institutions, might not be more productive, at 
least for some children? The answer is, there is no evidence that it wouldn’t. 
The same is true of fixed administrative structures. There is no evidence that schools 
employing less than the funded numbers of administrators and spending money in ways 
other than now required are less productive; there is reason to think that schools could 
be more productive if they traded in some administrators so they could spend more on 
teachers or technical resources. There is no proof that what is now funded is optimal, and 
there is reason to think that other ways of spending could be more productive. 
The same could be said for many other policies that tie funds to particular uses. For 
example, states want high school students to learn chemistry and biology, but, given the 
many productive ways of integrating the two subjects into one superior course, there is no 
reason to fund instruction in a way that requires these subjects to be taught separately.
In fact there is every reason for states to distribute money in ways that are wide open to 
uses such as the ones described above and to other uses that no one has yet thought of. The 
only way Americans can ever know whether some uses of funds are more productive than 
others is to allow many different uses and closely track and compare the results.
How can states provide money for K-12 education in ways that encourage continuous im-
provement? Not, as we have shown, by funding things whose value relative to plausible 
options is unproven. The answer is that states should fund something that is permanent, 
not changeable in light of evidence. Others might imagine different ways to do this, but we 
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can think of only one: states should tie money to the one element of the education system 
to which they should be unconditionally committed—students. 
Tying money to students means allocating a specific amount for every child seeking to 
attend a publicly funded school and distributing money to districts and schools solely on 
the basis of enrollment. States could decide to allocate more for one group of children than 
for another (for example, allocating more than the average amount of money to support 
education of children who do not speak English). But consistent with not funding things 
whose value is unknown, states would allocate money to districts for those children’s 
education, rather than for any specific program or administrative structure.  
If states would combine all the money they now spend on K-12 education, divide it up 
by enrollment (with the same fraction of the total assigned to each child) and distrib-
ute dollars to school districts in the same way, they could simultaneously eliminate both 
the barriers to innovation and improvement inherent in current funding systems and the 
confusion about where state money goes. Money would go wherever children are educated, 
not be held centrally to preserve particular schools or programs. This would allow new 
uses of funds, an essential precondition to experimentation. 
The federal government could reinforce the movement toward pupil-based funding by 
making its major grant funds pupil-specific. It could do that by sharply defining student 
eligibility criteria for such programs as Title I, and then requiring that states divide the 
money received from any such program equally among all eligible recipients in the 
state and allocate it to the schools those children attend. Thus, federal programs could 
still increase spending on designated beneficiaries without privileging particular uses or 
creating bureaucracies. 
Funding students is a move in the right direction, but it is not enough. States must also 
make sure that all funds move from one school to another as students transfer. This could 
be accomplished via a choice system, which would allow students to move whenever their 
parents thought they had identified a more suitable school for their child, or administra-
tively, as districts decided to close down low-performing schools and transfer students to 
more promising options. Free movement of funds would impact school budgets, immedi-
ately creating incentives for schools to avoid losing students to other schools. Innovators 
(educators and social service professionals with new ideas) would also be encouraged by 
the certainty that they could get full funding for every student enrolled in their school or 
program.
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Fair Comparison of alternative Fund Uses
Even if funds were distributed in ways described above, continuous improvement would 
require something more. Differences between less and more effective forms of expendi-
ture might not always be immediately obvious. As recent disputes over effectiveness of 
charter schools have shown, straight comparisons of schools or programs on student test 
scores can hide real differences in productivity. Schools with relatively high scores can look 
superior only because they have more advantaged students and extra resources; schools 
with relatively low scores can still be helping their students catch up quickly and be much 
more productive than other schools with similar populations.
The only way anyone can know whether a given use of funds is productive is to compare 
it in a completely fair way with other uses of funds. In this context “fair” means alert to 
factors other than educational effectiveness that can affect performance, and, considering 
ways funds are used, measured in real dollars not averages.
States that wanted to learn about costs and effectiveness of districts, schools, programs, 
or classes of teachers would need to assemble and keep good data on students (including 
their school and course enrollment records over time, course completion, and test scores 
for every year) as well as spending information on every entity or program that serves a 
student, plus information on teacher attributes. Properly kept and organized so that all 
student, administrative, cost, and teacher records were linked, such data could be used to 
identify highly effective (and cost-effective) uses of funds and also to identify outliers on 
the negative side. 
A few states keep linked school, student, and teacher records that could be used for this 
analysis. None have fine-enough grained expenditure data, for the simple reason that these 
are kept in broad district-wide summaries and cannot be traced down to the level of a 
school or classroom. Since, as we have shown, district-wide aggregates hide huge variations 
in actual spending, these data cannot be used to explore links among spending, people and 
services paid for, and student outcomes.
Student-based funding and accounting would change all this. States could then analyze the 
uses of funding at any level they wanted, find highly productive programs and practices 
that should be imitated, and also identify unproductive schools, districts, programs, etc.
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States could then choose how they would use such data to improve school productivity. 
Some might start simply by giving school districts the results and calling attention to op-
portunities and problems in need of attention. Some districts might want the raw data so 
they could perform their own analyses and get out ahead of the state on distinguishing 
more- from less-productive schools and practices. States might offer grants for reproduc-
tion of extremely effective practices or pay for formation of assistance organizations or 
school management organizations from which districts might seek help. States might also 
share results with one another, identifying standout practices or school providers that 
might be exported to districts in other states. 
New investments and incentives for innovation
States that rigorously identified productive schools and programs would be in a position 
to distinguish between districts that provided the most effective services for their children 
and those that did not. They would also be able to inform district and school leaders about 
available options evident in other districts and states.
States could also increase the range of options available for district and school leaders by 
sponsoring experimentation with new schooling models (for example, new applications of 
cyber school technology in custodial schools that have struggled to teach core subjects). 
States might also sponsor experimentation with fusions of schools and youth service 
agencies that combine funding from education and social services to provide more focused 
and individualized family and health services. By all these methods, including monitoring 
the experience of other states so ideas from elsewhere could be imported and tried out, 
states could give localities help they have never had before.
If states were to search for productive new options in these ways, they would create strong 
incentives for innovation. People with bold new ideas could work with the state to get them 
tried out and validated. School leaders and principals would know that new ideas would be 
fairly tested and effective ones recognized. The bureaucratic risks now attached to “doing 
it differently” would disappear. School leaders who wanted to expand their influence by 
advising other schools or by forming organizations to help large numbers of schools at 
once could do so. People with ideas about new forms of teacher work or new technology 
applications could expect fair treatment. Community entrepreneurs who wanted to form 
innovative charter schools that combine instruction with broader youth services could also 
expect to get a fair chance. 
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States that found districts reluctant to change in light of evidence could take more direct 
action. They could implement the accountability provisions of No Child Left Behind or their 
own standards-based reform programs to require districts to implement more produc-
tive practices in low-performing schools or to create options for students in unproductive 
schools. States could also use these data to determine whether to encourage independent 
provision of schools in a locality that proved unable to make progress (for example, by 
setting up alternative charter school authorizers to work in the locality) or to assign part of 
a locality to a new special-purpose school district, as Louisiana has done in New Orleans 
and Baton Rouge.
Strong actions like these are likely to be rare: information about options and the prospect 
of state action should be enough to motivate most districts to act. It is true, however, that 
some districts lack capacity to pursue good opportunities or are too bound up in local 
politics to change the status quo. In those cases, the state faces a stark choice between doing 
nothing (and thus accepting continued educational failure in some localities) and taking 
actions that fulfill its responsibility to provide effective schools for all its children.
Performance-Based accountability
Traditionally, accountability in public education has been seen as a grab bag of techniques 
for praising, shaming, or threatening employees in order to motivate effort. If those tech-
niques did not achieve the desired effect, state and district leaders were stuck. Little could 
be done to change uses of funds that were mandated by federal or state governments or 
courts, and employees might be reassigned but they were guaranteed jobs. Schools were 
assumed to be permanent: They might get a new program or a few new staff members, but 
they could not be replaced.
Accountability for performance is very different. Individuals and organizations who are 
legally responsible to ensure every child gets an effective education—governors, local school 
board members, and superintendents—must search for options until they find what works. 
They can delegate tasks, but only on a contingent basis depending on results. Governors 
and local superintendents, for example, can decide whether to rely on one provider or 
another, or on their own employees, to perform a particular task. But no matter to whom 
work is assigned, top leaders remain ultimately responsible for whether students learn. 
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Public officials who say, “We have tried and tried but the people to whom we assigned the 
task just can’t do it, so we can do no more,” have not just delegated responsibility, they 
have abdicated it. Officials who deprive themselves of options—for example, by protect-
ing programs, employees, or schools whether or not they work for children—implicitly 
abdicate their own responsibilities. 
Performance-based accountability is ultimately based on options. Responsible officials 
like governors and superintendents need to not only measure school performance but also 
remain aware of options. Are schools elsewhere doing better than ours with a particular 
student population? Are there people and organizations locally or elsewhere who could 
provide a better option for students who are not now learning what they need to know? 
If some schools are not working for their students, one option always available is to leave 
the task in the same hands but to make changes—greater resources, more training, hiring 
expert advisors or more capable employees—that make success more likely. However, that 
is often not enough. Top officials also need to be willing to—and avoid giving away their 
power to—reassign schools, cancel and replace programs, bring in new school providers 
from the community or elsewhere, replace staff, and make new trade-offs between 
employees and technology.
A continuous improvement system requires that someone remain in charge, not of 
dictating what every school will do, but of constantly assessing performance and looking 
for better alternatives. This is a role that has slipped away from state and local officials, but 
someone must play it. In the localities that are moving toward continuous improvement 
(for example, New York, New Orleans, Chicago), this role is played by the superintendent, 
supported by a re-missioned district central office that tracks performance and constantly 
works to develop options. The superintendent, often backed by the mayor or state superin-
tendent, makes the final decisions but the district central office’s job is to make sure there 
are always options. Other public sector organizations committed to doing whatever it takes 
to get high performance have similar arrangements.
Another principle of performance-based accountability is that a person or entity cannot 
hold itself accountable. If one entity (say the school) decides how to spend money to 
deliver instruction and support other activities, some other entity must judge its perfor-
mance and determine whether there are better options. Thus, if schools make key decisions 
about spending, staffing, and instruction, school districts can hold them accountable. But 
if school districts make all the decisions for schools (including committing to contracts 
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that determine who works in schools and how time is used), some other entity must hold 
the district accountable. 
States do not often hold districts accountable, but they can. Districts are, after all, creatures 
of the state whose powers, boundaries, and very existence are based in state law and regula-
tion. Under a continuous improvement scheme, states must treat districts as if they were 
providers of groups of schools, to be judged on the basis of performance.  
If particular districts do nothing to improve their low-performing schools, states could take 
over whole districts or re-assign groups of low-performing schools to new special-purpose 
districts. Louisiana’s Recovery School District serves this purpose statewide. It can take 
over schools or groups of low-performing schools (including the majority of schools in a 
particular district) and assign them to new providers, re-staff them, or even close them. 
The Recovery district might eventually return control of these schools to their original 
districts. But it also might oversee the schools it has taken over indefinitely or assign them 
to other existing or new districts. 
Whether at the state or district levels, officials who oversee performance-based account-
ability systems always work in the face of risk and uncertainty. A promising new provider 
might not be as good as it looks. A struggling provider might get worse, not better, after 
it receives help. A provider whose contract was terminated for low performance might 
eventually improve. Performance managers try to minimize these risks by paying close 
attention to events that affect performance and by weighing every action against possible 
alternatives. But they focus on increasing the probability of success, rewarding results not 
effort. 
Forthcoming reports from the Center on Reinventing Public Education and the National 
Alliance of Charter School Authorizers will provide further guidance and models for states 
and localities that want to practice performance-based accountability.
implications for Policy
Table 3 summarizes necessary changes in state law and policy. As the second column of 
the table shows, to create a continuous improvement system, state leaders would need to 
do more than make positive changes in their funding laws and regulatory structures. They 
47Financing Productive Schools
would also need to eliminate statutory and regulatory provisions that hide uses of funds or 
tie dollars up for the support of institutions, programs, and employees whose productiv-
ity needs to be proven, not assumed.15 These changes are fundamental; all would require 
redesign of legislation, regulation, and state accounting systems.16 See Appendix C for a 
comparison of these recommendations with those made by the National Working Group 
on Funding Student Learning. 
15. The National Working Group on Funding Student learning has recommended that states and localities adopt 
“reform oriented collective bargaining,” described as follows: Traditional collective bargaining agreements are 
problematic for learning-oriented finance systems in general and continuous improvement in particular. They pay 
teachers on a uniform salary schedule and use seniority to control assignments. They limit professional development, 
restrict evaluation, protect individual teachers, and ignore student performance. They make sharp distinctions 
between labor and management, view bargaining as adversarial, and restrict flexibility regarding contract provisions 
(Koppich 2007). in terms of resource management—converting resources into student learning results—traditional 
contracts represent a rigid, uniform, non-strategic approach that focuses on teacher interests rather than student 
learning. in contrast, reform-oriented collective bargaining agreements view union-management relationships as 
collaborative and student learning as a joint responsibility. They allow differentiated teacher roles and compensation, 
fit assignments to needs, and permit new forms of professional development and evaluation. Reform-oriented 
agreements also include provisions for career development, link contract components to district-wide school 
improvement efforts, and allow some flexibility in their application. Moreover, acknowledging that teachers’ 
collective actions affect public obligations, reform-oriented bargaining protects teaching, too, not just individual 
teachers. Because collective bargaining agreements control both the bulk of school district funding and key factors 
in teacher and student success, they are inseparable from effective resource use. Reform-oriented agreements 
acknowledge this relationship by exploring new ways to connect teacher-related resources with instruction and 
student learning. This reform-oriented approach represents a recent and still uncommon development in collective 
bargaining. however, it has evolved under the same legal guidelines as traditional bargaining and the leadership 
of both National Education association and american Federation of Teachers affiliates. its learning orientation 
deserves further exploration.
16. The National Working Group on Funding Student learning presents a similar analysis and draws conclusions 
that are identical in intent though worded slightly differently. See National Working Group on Funding Student 
learning (2008).
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table 3.  how State law and policy can Support continuouS 
improvement
what’s needed how to get it
Easy flow of people and money 
from less to more productive uses
Fund students, not programs or adults.
Account for use of funds down to the school, 
classroom, and student.
Move money administratively or via choice.
Fair comparison of alternative 
fund uses 
Link records on spending, services, student 
characteristics, and outcomes.
Compare programs, schools, teachers on a 
cost-effectiveness basis.
Incentives for innovation Encourage unprecedented uses of funds, 
methods, technologies, and human resources.
Maintain neutrality between providers of 
instruction, whether conventional or new.
Performance-based accountability Top officials retain power to re-assign schools, 
change staffing, and create options.
Districts (and state departments of education) 
are re-missioned to support judgments about 
schools and develop options. 
Table 3 does not answer a big question: Should states allocate money to districts and let 
them make decisions about how to spend it, or should they require that districts pass 
money on to schools and let school leaders make spending decisions? The answer is that 
states could choose either course of action, as long as they required districts to account for 
funds down to the level of the student. With that requirement, it would be clear how money 
was used and what individual students experienced. Of course, allocating money directly 
to schools is likely to generate greater diversity in practice and therefore be more conducive 
to learning about the effectiveness of innovative practices. 
A state’s decision about where to lodge spending discretion has implications for account-
ability. If school leaders have spending discretion, it is reasonable to let them reap the 
consequences, good and bad, of those decisions. Thus, schools that hire and support good 
teachers and provide focused instruction leading to student learning can be rewarded with 
continued freedom of action, and schools that decline or remain stuck at low levels of per-
formance can face strong intervention, competition from new schools, or closure. Districts 
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can hold schools accountable in these ways, and the state can hold the districts accountable 
in ways described in the preceding section. 
If districts exercise all spending discretion, they cannot hold themselves accountable. If 
a district controls spending but runs many unproductive schools, the state then faces the 
difficult problem of whether to intervene in or sanction the district because of low perfor-
mance in a few schools or to let sleeping dogs lie.
Ironically, a district that allocates funds directly to schools is likely to generate more 
options and better evidence about what works than a district that makes spending decisions 
centrally. Similarly, a state that requires districts to let schools make spending decisions has 
more and finer-grained options when schools fail. By lodging spending decisions at the 
school level, a state can create strong performance incentives for both districts and schools. 
By lodging spending decisions at the district level, a state makes districts unable to hold in-
dividual schools accountable. It also creates new responsibilities and headaches for itself.
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chaPter 6.  
conclusion
The main message of this report is that states cannot both continue funding schools and 
regulating schools in traditional ways and know what is the right amount of money to spend 
or how to spend it. State leaders have a fundamental choice to make: whether to continue 
tying funds to administrative structures, employee groups, and programs or to give schools 
money in ways that allow experimentation and continuous learning about what is possible 
given many alternative uses of funds and what works in different situations.
Every level of government and educational administration—from the federal government 
to the local school district—has adopted methods of funding schools that make it difficult 
to see how money is used and how spending links to student learning. However, state gov-
ernments both provide the most money and now do the most to create opaqueness and 
complexity. The states are also the entities that can do the most to open up the system so 
that links between spending and student learning can be understood. States fund dozens 
of different programs and forbid schools and districts from making alternative uses of 
funds given for particular purposes. They also require schools to be staffed in certain ways, 
require that certain subjects be taught in isolation from others, and mandate certain class 
sizes and uses of teacher and student time. State legislatures are often willing to increase 
spending on schools, but they also impose new constraints and program boundaries to go 
along with the new money. 
State officials who have helped create these rules and constraints rightly point out that each 
one of them was imposed for a purpose. Many state programs were intended to reverse 
patterns of neglect of particular groups of children or to make sure districts spent enough 
money to maintain school buildings. More recently, as our SFRP studies of state finance 
systems revealed, legislators who wanted to increase education spending also feared that 
local collective bargaining would capture all new money so that teachers would be paid 
more for doing the same things. Tying the money to new programs and requirements, leg-
islators hoped, would ensure that new state spending led to improvements in instruction. 
It is clear that the era of mandates and standardization based on false confidence in the one 
best system needs to end. Governors and legislators can put themselves in positions to find 
more effective uses of funds and constantly improve schools in light of what works by:
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Driving funds to schools based on student counts.  ■ The goal should be to deliver 
real budgets to local principals, which they should be responsible for allocating 
and managing within their schools. Legislatures can use weighting if desired to 
allocate extra money for disadvantaged children. Congress can also amend Title I 
so that it allocates funds on a per-pupil basis based on student characteristics, right 
down to the school a student attends.
Keeping linked data about uses of funds and results so that alternative methods of  ■
delivering instruction can be compared on cost and effectiveness. 
encouraging innovation and experimentation with new uses of funds and imagi- ■
native new instructional programs. States should demand relentless innovation 
and school improvement, building on what works and eliminating what does not. 
The goal should be annual measurable improvement in school and student perfor-
mance. Data and analysis capacities, mentioned above, are necessary supports for 
innovation and experimentation. 
Holding schools and districts accountable for student performance and con- ■
tinuous improvement. State legislatures should re-mission school districts and 
state education agencies to manage portfolios of schools on the basis of perfor-
mance. Superintendents and chief state school officers should be held responsible 
for judging school performance and finding better options for children whose 
schools do not teach them effectively. Policymakers should help build central office 
capacity to analyze evidence on performance and find or develop more productive 
methods, staff, and school providers.
The old computer is overloaded, can’t run all the programs we have attached to it, and was 
never designed for the things we now most need done. It is time for a new model, not just 
a marginal upgrade.
The time for gradualism has come and gone. Until educators and policymakers pay attention 
to the agenda laid out in this report, schools in the United States will continue the endless 
circling around the same set of issues that has consumed them for the last 25 years.
A school finance system built for continuous improvement is not committed to charter-
ing, vouchers, standardized curricula, or to any other specific school reform. It would not 
assume that district-run schools were less effective than charters or vice versa or that par-
ticular uses of time, money, staff, and materials were always better. Such a system would 
also minimize rules and constraints on use of funds so that new ideas could be readily 
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tried. It would be wide open to experimentation, measurement of costs and performance 
oversight, and differentiation in uses of funds and instructional practice.
Adopting a school financing system based on continuous improvement would transform 
school districts. But, as our sketch of the current school finance system shows, districts 
cannot make these changes by themselves. 
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aPPenDix c.  
recommendation comparison
how Recommendations in This Report line Up with Those Made 
by the National Working Group on Funding Student learning
this report working group report recommendations and actions
Drive all funds to schools 
based on student counts.
Deliver resources transparently and flexibly. 
Attach federal, state, and local funding to students.
Deposit student-based funding in school-linked accounts that 
operate on the basis of real-dollar budgeting.
Keep linked data about uses of 
funds and results.
Create and support data systems that link student learning, 
finance, and human resource information.
Encourage innovation and 
experimentation.
Focus and enable educators’ work.
Develop educators’ abilities to align and adapt resources 
effectively.
Explore reform-oriented collective bargaining.
Expand resource knowledge and experiment with new 
methods. 
Fund research and development on continuous improvement.
Strengthen charter laws or create other mechanisms to allow 
outside-the-box experiments on resource and school options.
Continue to investigate how much money it takes to get all 
students to standards.
Expand the R&D agenda to link education with the broader 
array of resources available to children and youth.
Hold districts and schools 
accountable for student 
performance.
Redesign resource accounting and accountability. 
Revise government accounting and financial reporting 
standards and practices to reflect outcome principles and 
measures.
Develop performance incentives for adults and students. 
Define resource responsibilities and structure contingencies 
on jobs, schools, and funding.
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